Thursday, 3 February 2011

Monopolies and cartels

Wikipedia does excellent crash courses in monopolies and cartels. Read up if you have quarter of an hour to spare, but most of this will be obvious to those who did a couple of units of economics and mainly it's just applying commonsense.

Assuming that the demand for their output is price elastic and all producers are profit maximisers, there is a subtle difference in how they go about things. The questions for you, dear readers, are at the end of each section.

Monopolies

1. The closest thing we can imagine to a complete monopoly is e.g. a water company. It would be more or less impossible for a competitor to nudge his way into the market, as he would have to spend billions on his own reservoirs, digging up the pavements and installing pipes to each house. Thus the water company need have no fear of competition, there is no way that a competitor can under cut his prices and compete away his profits.

2. In round figures, a typical annual domestic water bill is 320 cubic metres at £1.25 per m3, the price being capped by the government so an average household pays £400 a year. The marginal cost to the water company is 50p per m3, so it has £240 a year gross profit for fixed costs, inflated directors' salaries (which is profit share rather than payment for work done) and dividends.

3. What the water companies would like to do is to offer members of the government some tasty directorships (in practice, most politicians can be bought off for one or two hundred thousand pounds a year, as they have no other marketable skills) and scrap the £1.25 cap. Let's assume that they then nudge the prices up in their area and quantity used, being price elastic, goes down. The following table (completely made up figures for illustration purposes only) shows how this affects their gross profits ('GP'):

Price £1.25, usage 320 m3 = £400, less £160 costs = GP £240
Price £2.50, usage 240 m3 = £600, less £120 costs = GP £480
Price £3.75, usage 180 m3 = £675, less £90 costs = GP £585
Price £5.00, usage 120 m3 = £600, less £60 costs = GP £540
Price £6.25, usage 80 m3 = £500, less £40 costs = GP £460

Question 1: which price would the water company charge?

Question 2: if the marginal cost of treating and delivering 1 m3 went up to 75p, would the water company increase or reduce the price from the previous answer, or would it continue charging the same price?


Cartels

4. Here we have lots of competing/co-operating suppliers, who could either agree a fixed minimum price OR a fixed maximum quantity (but not both).

5. The most famous cartels are de Beers and OPEC, both of whom agree to restrict quantity in order to push up price. This is clearly collusion, but as they operate across borders and the members of these cartels are usually governments, there is little that other countries can do to stop them. Members of cartels always cheat and supply more than their allotted quota, but by and large, they seem to function quite well (from the point of view of the members!)

6. Smaller cartels operate on a national or local level. These are subject to national (or EU) legislation, so they can't be so blatant as to set maximum output (i.e. to voluntarily restrict their own output) so they are more likely to agree set a minimum price, which is an offence if done by express agreement, but in the absence of proof thereof, it is difficult for legislators to prove that there is active collusion.

7. Unfortunately for the cartel members, boosting their profits by agreeing a minimum price is only half the battle, as new entrants could still move in to the market and under cut them. So what these smaller or local cartels are more likely to focus on is raising barriers to entry to restrict supply. This is not collusion between the members as such, because they dress it up with guff like 'Ensuring that our members meet the highest standards' so in theory anybody can join that industry, but in practice they can't. Plus, politicians just love imposing regulations on industries, which just happen to also act as barriers to entry.

Question 3: Assuming that members of a cartel have achieved its goal of setting a profit maximising price/output level, what impact would an increase in their input costs have? Would they increase or reduce their prices, or would they keep them the same?

And returning to my favourite 'industry'...

Bonus question 1: Do owners of land and buildings in any location act more like a monopoly or like a cartel?

Bonus question 2: Assuming that owners of land and buildings have restricted output to a level which gives them a large element of super-profits, what impact would an increase in their input costs* have on the rents or price they charge - would they increase them, reduce them or keep them the same?

Bonus question 3: How do we measure in £'s the amount of super-profits accruing to the owner of any particular land and buildings?


* Remember that interest is not an input cost, it is a cost of ownership or a way of splitting up the total income between owner and bank, ditto the tax that the owner pays on his rent or capital gains, which is a way of splitting up the total income between owner and government. Their real input costs are things like repairs, insurance, letting and estate fees and so on. But for the purposes of this discussion it is not necessary to make this distinction.

8 comments:

DBC Reed said...

I once put the argument that a water company was a natural monopoly on the Redwood site: I said for competition to exist you would have a choice of different taps like TV channels. The old boy went ape-shit.
We have previously discussed on this site how competing firms increase bureaucracy with duplicate mangement systems ,surplus staff and office buidings and that one of the theoretical benefits of merging is to rationalise overheads,(though you claim overheads go up post merger--which is worse).
But it is difficult to see how firms ever compete over long periods of time.Take the Tesco towns which only have one supemarket.The remedy constantly adduced is :stick in another supermarket chain.But they will not compete in real terms but will have a few price wars round the edges like a commercial version of 1984.They will not compete in maintaining a stock inventory to supply all of the town's (say 100,000) inhabitants.They will stock up,quite reasonably,to supply 50,000 each,not rock the boat by staffing up and stocking up to supply 100,000 and get on with business as usual.
Competition is more honoured in the breach than the observance (or whatever the Bard said).
Competition is the basis of the whole all-singing tent show laissez-faire revival at the monent but is faith-based and does not stand up to Enlightenment scutiny.

Tim Almond said...

We have previously discussed on this site how competing firms increase bureaucracy with duplicate mangement systems ,surplus staff and office buidings and that one of the theoretical benefits of merging is to rationalise overheads,(though you claim overheads go up post merger--which is worse).

I've worked in organisations which have merged and at least in the medium term, they become less efficient. It's not just that you're merging software systems and processes, but merging people who suit a certain sort of organisational culture with people from a different organisational culture.

The other thing with organisations is that there's a point where further scaling doesn't add much, and where the bureaucracy and internal politics that comes with size starts to cost more.

Lola said...

Whatever. I know that I am being stitched up - whether it's by a cartel or a monopoly.

Lok, I have to do real work today. I can't spend time working out these puzzles....

Deniro said...

Qu1 585 Qu2 585

With the caveat that the question does not define the factors which give the crest in the demand curve. There is an alternative to using water and paying rent if there is a crest in the demand curves.

Mark Wadsworth said...

DBC, see what JT says. There are economies and diseconomies of scale.

L, hope you get it all sorted out.

Den, correct. As I said, I just invented some figures for the demand curve, it might be steeper or flatter than that.

DBC Reed said...

With reference to JT's comment, I did say that reducing overheads was one of the theoretical benefits of merging,not that it always followed.
I was rather hoping for some challenge to the more contentious statement that it is difficult to see how firms ever really compete over the long term .Something rather basic.

Mark Wadsworth said...

DBC: "It is difficult to see how firms ever really compete over the long term. Something rather basic."

In the absence of natural monopolies (like water companies), we have...
a) Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
b) There are economies and diseconomies of scale (so once you are big enough, there is no advantage to getting bigger)
c) Some old, large businesses fail to keep up with the times and/or make disastrous acquisitions (GEC, AOL Time Warner, IBM)
d) Even within a cartel (supermarkets, banks) there is some competition.
e) Specialisation. A car repair workshop is different to a hair-dressers. They will never form a cartel. Iceland is at the other end of the scale to Waitrose.
f) And so on.

DBC Reed said...

a) This body does more to prevent monopolies than promote competition.Firms could happily co-exist ,not trespassing on each other's turf and not really competing.Its existence shows that firms need to be forced to compete:not the laissez faire utopia whichis supposed to result anarchist-style from the absence of rules and regulations.
b)Firms can be as big and small as you like but still not compete.
c) Firms becoming hopelessly out of date shows the tooth of competition is not that sharp.The absence of competion allows this to happen.Acquisitions are a handy way of increasing market share without having to compete .
d)Agreed but this is not existential competition .
e) Hairdressers and car repairers are n't normally in direct competition with each other,though some barbers obviously hanker for the inspection pit and the smell of oil.