When it isn't, says Sobers. As a landowner/developer he sticks to the party line that it's all the government's fault:
... there is no way the developer can build houses for much less than he has budgeted for, once the planning is signed and sealed. If the market drops, and houses aren't worth enough to cover the already agreed s.106 costs (or indeed any site specific infrastructure costs) then the project gets mothballed. No-one is going to build houses if it means you lose tens of thousands on every one.
That is why developers have large banks of land with extant planning permissions, they have to keep the price of houses up to make the numbers add up. The State already HAS a development land tax, its called the s.106 agreement system. That is why the price of houses is so high, the State is setting a fixed tax on every house that is sold. Not a % of the value, a fixed cash amount. And if the house doesn't sell for enough to cover that fixed amount plus the cost of building it, then it doesn't get built, as simple as that.
To fight him on his chosen turf, this is part of the explanation of why some projects are mothballed in a downturn. We note that the downturn was the period 2008-2010. Since then, prices have been ticking up in most areas, shooting up in some. Funnily enough, volumes have not increased, they have stuck to the time-honoured profit maximising level of "one new home for every nine existing homes bought and sold".
So this has naff all to do with land banking, as such. It certainly does not refute the observation that house builders are ruthless profit maximisers, unaffected by anything as troublesome as "competition". As I said in the earlier post, these land banks are just symptoms of their monopolistic position and not a problem in themselves.
-----------------------------------------
To go into a bit more depth...
1. It's not just the s106 payments/obligations. Between bare site and finished, occupied home, the farmer pays CGT on his profit, the developer pays SDLT on the land he buys, the council charges planning fees, imposes an affordable housing quota, charges Community Infrastructure Levy and s106 agreements, and the new owner pays another layer of SDLT.
These all act as a kind of "development land tax", which clearly discourages development. On the other hand, home builders can reclaim all input VAT (but do not have to charge it) and benefit from Help To Buy and similar subsidies.
It can't be too difficult to work out what the net revenues are (taxes minus subsidies) and replace it with a flat rate LVT that is approximately fiscally neutral, and applies as soon as planning permission is given (with maybe a grace period of a few months or a year). Which would encourage development.
2. As I learned at the one-day RICS conference I attended, it is quite clear that town planners know perfectly well that by granting planning, they are also granting massive unearned windfall gains to landowners and they try and claw as much of this back as possible (planning fees, affordable housing quotas etc).
We also know that if there's any sort of a downturn, developers do go back to councils and haggle them down with so-called viability assessments.
These viability assessments always start with the original price paid for the land as a "cost", which ought to be taken as zero in all cases - or else developers can wriggle out of their commitments by selling to another developer for a higher price. Funnily enough, councils don't haggle them back up again if there's a subsequent upturn. So it is not a fixed cash amount anyway.
It is, as Sobers says, all a kind of tax. But it is a million miles from being a "fixed cash amount", it is very much a percentage of the available windfall gain. Councils in the south east can claw back up to £100,000 per home; in Newcastle it's only £10,000 per home.
3. In real life, the selling price of existing homes dictates the selling price of new homes; which in turn dictates the amount of planning gain the council can claw back. Sobers gets it completely arse-backwards and suggests that the amount the council claws back dictates the price of new homes; which in turn dictates the price of existing homes.
4. Even if Sobers' conclusion were correct (it isn't), this is still no explanation for why the home builders cartel kept output low once the downturn finished and why they have since acquired enough surplus land to cover ten years supply.
Let's contrast home builders with a free(ish), competitive market, like car manufacturing.
Ford, Volkswagen et al want to sell as many cars as possible; new cars have to sell for slightly more than cost to be viable, that's about it, the rest is about volume (spreading the fixed cost of development over as many units as possible) The price of new cars, and the number of cars available dictates the price of second hand cars. Which is quite the opposite of the situation with housing.
And yes, luxury sports car makers restrict output to keep prices high, which means that their cars maintain their resale value much better than Fords or Volkswagens - but as sure as heck, Porsche and Ferrari don't have massive warehouses somewhere, stashed with ten years' worth of raw materials.
Ford and Volkswagen don't have ten years' worth of finished cars that they are sitting in car parks, wailing that it's really difficult getting them through the initial MOT and blaming bureaucrats. Which, again, is quite the opposite of the situation with housing.
Thursday, 30 November 2017
When is land banking not land banking? (2)
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
15:12
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comments
Labels: EM, land banking
When is land banking not land banking?
When City AM says it isn't:
Hammond said the government will be commissioning a review of the gap between the number of planning permissions granted and the number of new homes being built. If developers are holding back land for “commercial, rather than technical” reasons, the government will intervene, Hammond said, using compulsory purchase powers if necessary...
According to analysis by Shelter, the current land bank of the ten largest listed developers could provide 404,040 homes. At the current rate developers build at, this land would take six years to develop... So, it is beyond doubt that developers own land they haven’t built on yet. But are they deliberately holding onto it to push up house prices?
Anthony Codling, a property market analyst at Jefferies Bank, says land-banking is a “myth”. He argues there are many other limiting factors behind the surplus land. Obtaining planning permission is difficult, there is a limited workforce, and there may be inadequate infrastructure at large sites. Utilities companies, for example, can also be accountable for a delay.
Alan Brown, chief executive of housebuilder CALA group says tying up capital in land with no houses on it “simply isn’t in our financial interests”. Instead, the delay is caused by cash-strapped local authority planning departments, he said. Housebuilders need evidence of cash-flow to drive investment; this is also a reason why they need to acquire land in advance.
They whitewash the issue by redefining "land banking" and as per usual blaming it on local councils.
Hammond, himself indirectly a land banker, defines it correctly as "holding back land for commercial reasons". House builders are profit maximising enterprises with a monopolistic position, so of course they keep new supply at whatever the profit maximising volume is - which Neal Hudson worked out was one new home for each nine existing homes bought and sold in the year. The ratio has been constant for decades, and was the same decades ago when there were lots of small home builders instead of today's oligarchy.
This is smoking gun #1. In 2008-09 when home sales plummeted, home builders mothballed a lot of their developments to maintain the one-to-nine ratio. They gave spurious reasons such as lack of finance, which is clearly a lie - if you have lenders snapping at your heels, the best thing to do is to get developments finished and sold and the debts paid off. Conversely, if you have agreed to lend somebody £100,000 to finance a project, you would be mad to lend them half the money to half-finish something and then refuse to hand over the rest. At that stage you've got to keep going.
As output is decided by external factors, if new planning permissions exceed this level of output (as they do), then these companies will accumulate land banks - the land banks are evidence of profit-maximising behaviour (Hammond's "commercial reaons") and not a crime in themselves. If there were plenty of affordable housing, then it wouldn't matter whether the large home builders have land banks for one, ten or a hundred years' worth of output.
In a report on land-banking, the Home Builders Federation said: “A house building company will be judged by investors on the land that is available to it. If one considers land to be a housebuilder’s most important raw material, a company seeking investment with little or no viable land in its ownership would be unlikely to attract the investment required to finance construction and generally operate as a well-functioning business.”
This is a straight forward admission that his members are land banking, he just says it's for a different reason.
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
11:48
7
comments
Labels: EM, land banking
Wednesday, 29 November 2017
Can you help a friend in trouble?
From: Michel.barnier.EUParliament@gmail.com
To: May.T@Parliament.uk
Dear Friend
I am sorry to contact you like this but I have some bad news. I am on holiday in Africa and my wallet and passport have been stolen.
Can you extend me the kindness of a short term loan so that I can get home? I need €50 billion which I will repay as soon as I am back.
Please send money to my PayPal account using my email address.
Many thanks for being such a true friend!
Michel Barnier
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
13:39
6
comments
Labels: Brexit
Tuesday, 28 November 2017
Killer Arguments Against LVT, Not (427)
Via MBK, a fairly positive article about LVT at Bloomberg, which then goes into the political objections:
Why so unpopular? Here's Friedman's theory:
"It's not unpopular for good economic reasons. It's unpopular in my opinion for one simple reason: It's the only tax left on the books for which people have to write a big check."
Income taxes and Social Security contributions are withheld from paychecks before the recipients get their hands on the money. Sales taxes (and value-added taxes outside the U.S.) are remitted by merchants and other business. It's only with property taxes that a regular person gets a bill and has to pay it.
Seeing as Friedman himself helped design the US PAYE system back in the day, this is partly his fault.
As the author of the article himself explains in footnote 3, it is perfectly possible to deduct LVT monthly from paychecks via the PAYE system. That would be a good idea, even if we only have a low level property tax, like Council Tax. If LVT replaced taxes on earnings and output, for most working households, the total tax deducted would go down. For lower income pensioners (Poor Widows In Mansions, whose annual tax bills would inarguably increase), there would be the deferment option anyway.
If people are thinking of buying a home, the decision will be no different to now - they compare the rent they currently pay with the total of mortgage payments (and LVT) which they (as landowners) will have to pay. Experience shows that recent FTBs pay roughly as much on their mortgage as they did on rent, or would have been paying if they'd been renting the home they ended up buying. There's no reason to assume that this would change - the two would move in line. So the choice would be between paying £1,000 rent a month and paying £600 in mortgage repayments and £400 in LVT a month (or whatever), absolutely no disincentive to owner-occupation.
I can think of at least two other reasons for property taxes' unpopularity that are actually side effects of what economists like about them. To wit:
1. Property tax bills can rise without property owners doing anything, and
2. Rising tax bills can push property owners (homeowners in particular) to make economic decisions they might prefer to avoid.
People can adjust their spending, and often their income. But they can't help it if, say, house prices go up 80 percent in just three years -- as they did in California from 1975 to 1978. Well, actually, they could help it, by going to the polls in June 1978 and approving Proposition 13, a set of restrictions on property tax rates and assessments that have shaped the state's economy and government ever since.
Argument 1 is classic Homey DoubleThink: "I worked hard, invested wisely and deserve my land value increase; but as I contributed nothing towards the increase, I shouldn't be taxed on it".
Basing LVT on selling prices is a bad idea as they fluctuate wildly (unless you are doing a really low level LVT of 1% or less). Proper LVT would be based on rental values, which go up in line with local average earnings.
So let's assume a typical couple's wages are £4,000 a month and their LVT bill is £600, so their net wages are £3,400. If wages go up by £100 a month in that area, rents go up by a bit less £100 a month and their LVT goes up by a bit less than £100 a month, let's say from £600 to £680.
A 13% increase in their LVT bill sounds dramatic, but even if their wages don't go up, their net wages only fall by 2.4%, which they'd barely notice. Even if they think, sod this home-ownership lark, let's go back to renting, there's no incentive to do so, because their monthly housing costs would not go down as a result (if they stay in the same sort of home in the same area).
---------------------------------------
If we think all this through to its logical conclusion, LVT will then be attacked from the left by the Socialists, who say, "Ha! What you Georgists really want to do is price lower earners out of "nice" areas! You bastards!"
True dat, but so what?
Younger people and tenants of all ages are already priced out, even out of cheaper areas. It's only older low earners who bought decades ago who live in "nice" areas. Secondly, taxing land wealth (which is highly concentrated in a few hands) instead of earnings reduces inequality overall, it's redistribution from the few to the many, which is one of Mr J Corbyn's better slogans. Low earners who bought decades ago in "nice" areas are very much among "the few" and the priced-out under-40s; tenants of all ages; and low earning owner-occupiers who live in normal areas are "the many" for these purposes.
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
22:00
8
comments
Monday, 27 November 2017
Fun Online Polls: Brexit bill, royal weddings and riots
The results to last week's Fun Online Poll were as follows:
How much should the UK be prepared to pay the EU to kick start the Brexit negotiations?
£40 billion - 2%
Zilch - 34%
Zip - 2%
Jack - 3%
Nix - 3%
Diddly squat - 47%
Other, please specify - 8%
A clear for "diddly squat" with "zilch" in a good second place, is how I'd sum that up.
Thanks to all 95 who took part.
--------------------------------
And lo, the Powers That Be have decided to distract us plebs with another shameless display of consumption at our expense.
It occurred to me last time this happened that the worst outbreaks of rioting seem to follow royal extravanazas, when the distraction has worn off and people have to face back up to the normal joyless day-to-day grind.
So that's this week's Fun Online Poll.
"Will there be riots after next year's Royal Wedding?"
Vote here or use the widget in the sidebar.
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
18:44
1 comments
Labels: Brexit, FOP, Riots, Royal family
Sunday, 26 November 2017
Killer Arguments Against LVT, Not (426)
Paul Lewis did a fairly positive piece on LVT (in Scotland) on his Radio 4 Monyebox programme yesterday (h/t Bayard). Duncan Pickard was on top form.
They then invited David Melhuish of the Scottish Property Federation to put the arguments against:
I think, at the moment, we don't know enough about [LVT], so we are unpersuaded at this point, as [the MSP] said, there have been a number of studies of this in recent years and I think most of the conclusions have said that we need to do much further analysis on it.
I think that there's two big problems there.
Yes, I know that the economic theory is supportive of it, but there is a point about how this interacts with the planning system as well, and whether land is unimproved or not, it'll have to have a planning designation and the planning system is not easy to deal with and often a point of frustration. So I think the practicalities come into question at that point.
My other point would be, if you are talking about replacing other instruments of tax, you're probably shrinking the tax base considerably with some of those, and I think there's a risk inherent in that you could have a sizeable redistribution of tax on much fewer shoulders.
It could happen, it's a devolved area. I think there's a huge amount of practicalities to overcome. You've still got between Council Tax and Business Rates £4.5 billion of income and the fact that you would be shrinking the tax base, you know, I think that would put quite a burden on more people than [Duncan Pickard] thinks.
Wow. I'd have expected him to go in much harder than that, but he chose to get bogged down in technocratic sounding waffle.
Barely worth debunking, but here goes:
1. Initial valuations can be based on current actual use, same as council tax or business rates are/were. We can easily tweak those two existing assessment/collection systems to be so close to LVT as makes no difference. Then it can be extended to plots with actual planning permission, we know perfectly well what they've got planning permission for.
2. As it happens, the Scottish Land Revenue Group invited me to do a talk last year, so I know the numbers on this. Total receipts from Council Tax, Business Rates, Land & Buildings Transaction Tax (Scottish SDLT) and other bits and pieces that can be swept up, like planning fees, s106 agreements, Community Infrastructure Levy etc are just shy of £5 billion.
The total tax base, the total of the site premium of all residential and commercial buildings is at least £20 billion. That is completely unaffected by the taxes levied on it.
So a straight replacement LVT, just to get the ball rolling would be a bit less than 25% of the site premium. For most households or businesses, the initial LVT would be the same or less than Council Tax or Business Rates is now, for homes in higher value areas - and a very few shops or office on Princes Street in Edinburgh - it will be a lot more. Unfortunately, Inheritance Tax is not a devolved tax, in an ideal world that would be replaced as well, which would compensate for the higher taxes on the most expensive homes.
He confuses the 'tax base' with the number of people paying what proportion, and contradicts himself on whether more people would pay more or fewer people would pay more. Which is a classic Homey strategy. If those 'fewer shoulders' don't want to pay the LVT, they can sell up to somebody else who will.
Clearly, if LVT were then extended to replace income tax in its entirety (which the Scottish government could now do, if it wanted - see s11A of the Income Tax Act 2007, as inserted by FA 2014), this would mean that the tax rate would have to be about 70% of the current site premium. If the income tax cuts feed through into higher rental values, the LVT rate would be less than 50%. So it's perfectly do-able.
Assuming no change in behaviour, that would mean significant changes (increases or decreases) in how much tax some households or businesses pay, but once people have upsized and downsized, it will all sort itself out. The chances are, most will end up paying the same total, but out of larger overall incomes - with the other big bonuses that taxpayers are getting something directly in return for the taxes they pay, it will be semi-voluntary, as well as dampening land prices and having more efficient use of existing urban land.
What's not to like?
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
16:31
2
comments
"No EU-UK deal? It is not the end of the world", says WTO chief
From The Telegraph, via @montie:
Roberto Azevedo is not your typical Brazilian. Quietly spoken, and instinctively cautious, the director general of the World Trade Organisation is a career diplomat to his well-manicured fingertips. While a highly effective communicator – fluent in four languages – he belies the national stereotype for flair and flamboyance...
A bit of unnecessary stereotyping there to start the article, here's the relevant bit...
So what of the UK? If Britain fails to strike a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU ahead of March 2019, when we’re scheduled to leave, then UK-EU trade reverts to WTO rules. While some claim this would be a disaster, not least parliamentarians determined to frustrate Brexit, Azevedo disagrees.
“About half of the UK’s trade is already on WTO terms – with the US, China and several large emerging nations where the EU doesn’t have trade agreements. So it’s not the end of the world if the UK trades under WTO rules with the EU.
Acknowledging that an FTA would be best, with WTO rules involving reciprocal UK-EU tariffs, Azevedo still gainsays the gloom-mongers. “If you don’t have a fully functioning FTA with the EU, there could be rigidities and costs – but it’s not like trade between the UK and EU is going to stop. There will be an impact, but I suppose it is perfectly manageable.”
He points out that to maintain current levels of access in nations where the EU has already struck FTAs, the UK will need to negotiate new agreements with such countries after Brexit. But won’t the fact that EU agreements already exist with such countries help the UK to reach such deals?
“Trade deals are always complex,” says Azevedo. “But it may be helpful as some of the trade harmonisation is already there – that could act as a shortcut...”
AFAIAA, that's a non-issue, those trade terms will more or less automatically be replicated with new agreements between the UK and the other countries.
While the EU has cut around 50 FTAs, most are with very small countries. Despite 60 years of trying, Brussels has failed to strike deals with the US, China, Brazil, India and almost all other large economies. Why is this? “Trade deals are difficult but there is an additional complicating factor for the EU, which is agriculture,” says Azevedo. “Once you start negotiating with a big agricultural exporter, they want market access – and, for the EU, that’s a sensitive sector, both politically and economically, a sector that makes itself heard..."
After Brexit, Britain can be “more flexible in its approach and quicker to react within the WTO, as you don’t have to coordinate with all the other members of the EU”, observes Azevedo. “You will lose the weight of the EU as a market, but the UK is by no standards a minor economy or a minor player in the multilateral system.”
All good stuff. The article does not point out that adopting unilateral free trade is perfectly compatible with WTO membership, but maybe that's just taken as given? On a practical level, the UK doesn't really have the time and manpower to have anything else in place by 2019 (or whenever).
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
15:36
3
comments
Labels: Brexit, Free trade, WTO
Saturday, 25 November 2017
Friday, 24 November 2017
Philip Hammond v Philip Hammond
From (rather surprisingly) The Telegraph:
A housebuilding business founded by Philip Hammond has been accused of sitting on an undeveloped plot of land which has been granted planning permission for four new homes.
Castlemead Limited, which was co-founded by the Chancellor in 1984, builds new homes and doctor’s surgeries. It has been reported that Castlemead Group, which is majority-owned by the company, was granted permission to build four homes in north Wales in June 2010 on the condition work on the site would begin within five years...
The revelation comes after Mr Hammond gave an interview with The Sunday Times this week, in which he hit out at house builders who are sitting on hundreds of thousands of undeveloped plots of land which have planning permission for new homes...
A spokeswoman for Mr Hammond said: “Any shares in Castlemead are held in a trust. The chancellor has no direct influence or involvement and so is unable to comment.”
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
17:00
8
comments
Labels: Hypocrisy, land banking, Philip Hammond
Daily Mail on Top Form
From The Daily Mail:
Shocking moment middle-aged men struggle to break up vicious street fight between two young girls as they punch, kick and pull each other’s hair in in wealthy city suburb
* The two girls were filmed fighting in the Edinburgh Old Dalkeith Road area
* Two middle-aged men were forced to intervene and try and split up the girls
* A group of younger boys were encouraging the girls to continue fighting
* Homes in the Old Dalkeith Road area of Edinburgh regularly sellf [sic] for £1 million
Posted by
Mark Wadsworth
at
13:43
0
comments
Labels: crime, Daily Mail, House prices